# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESTLANDS WATER DISTRICT,

Plaintiff,

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA POWER AGENCY; SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT,

Plaintiff-Intervenors

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, et al.,

Defendants.

and

HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE; YUROK TRIBE,

Defendant-Intervenors.

IN RE TRINITY RIVER (B) (23) LITIGATION

CIV F 00-7124 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION



Westlands Water District ("Westlands"); San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority; and San Benito County Water District (collectively "water-districts"); the Northern California Power

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Agency ("NCPA"); and the Sacramento Municipal Utility District ("SMUD")<sup>2</sup> (collectively "plaintiffs") move for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The federal defendants, the Hoopa Valley Tribe, and the Yurok Tribe oppose the motions. Oral argument was heard on Monday, March 19, 2001.

# I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The underlying action involves the United States Department of Interior's ("Interior") administration of the Trinity River Division ("TRD") of the Central Valley Project ("CVP"), "the country's largest federal water reclamation project," and Interior's implementation of section 3406(b)(23)4 of the Central

The Secretary, immediately upon the enactment of this title,

NCPA is a joint powers agency formed under California law, contains fourteen public-agency members, including eleven cities, an irrigation district, a public utilities district, and a municipal port. See Doc. 105 ¶ 2 (NCPA complaint-in-intervention).

SMUD is a political subdivision of the State of California, formed under California law. See Doc. 109 ¶ 2 (SMUD complaint-in-intervention); Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 11501-4403.5 (2000). It serves over one-half million customers within a 900-square-mile area, including over 450,000 residential customers. See Doc. 109 ¶ 2.

O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677, 680-83 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Westlands Water Dist., F.Supp.2d \_\_, 2001 WL 263417, \* 1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2001).

CVPIA §§ 3406(b) and (b)(23) reads:

shall operate the Central Valley Project to meet all obligations under State and Federal law, including but not limited to the Federal Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq., and all decisions of the California State Water Resources Control Board establishing conditions on applicable licenses and permits for the project. The Secretary, in consultation with other State

Valley Project Improvement Act ("CVPIA") in such a way as to

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and Federal agencies, Indian tribes, and affected interests, is further authorized and directed to:

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(23) in order to meet Federal trust responsibilities to protect the fishery resources of the Hoopa Valley Tribe, and to meet the fishery restoration goals of the Act of October 24, 1984, Public Law 98-541, provide through the Trinity River Division, for water years 1992 through 1996, an instream release of water to the Trinity River of not less than three hundred and forty thousand acre-feet per year for the purposes of fishery restoration, propagation, and maintenance and,

- (A) by September 30, 1996, the Secretary, after consultation with the Hoopa Valley Tribe, shall complete the Trinity River Flow Evaluation Study currently being conducted by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service under the mandate of the Secretarial Decision of January 14, 1981, in a manner which insures the development of recommendations, based on the best available scientific data, regarding permanent instream fishery flow requirements and Trinity River Division operating criteria and procedures for the restoration and maintenance of the Trinity River fishery; and
- (B) not later than December 31, 1996, the Secretary shall forward the recommendations of the Trinity River Flow Evaluation Study, referred to in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the Select Committee on Indian Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives. If the Secretary and the Hoopa Valley Tribe concur in these recommendations, any increase to the minimum Trinity River instream fishery releases established under this paragraph and the operating criteria and procedures referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be implemented accordingly. If the Hoopa Valley Tribe and the Secretary do not concur, the minimum Trinity River instream fishery releases established under this paragraph shall remain in effect uless increased by an Act of Congress, appropriate judicial decree, or agreement between the Secretary and the Hoopa Valley Tribe. Costs associated with implementation of this paragraph shall be reimbursable as operation and maintenance expenditures pursuant to existing law. Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3406(b)(23), 106 Stat. 4600, at 4720-21.

Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3401-12, 106 Stat. 4600, 4706

allegedly reduce available CVP water and electricity to meet Interior's contractual commitments to the water-districts, 6 federal water-service contractors, and power generators, and adversely impact other parties, including the public.

The TRD transfers water from the Klamath River Basin in Trinity County, where the Trinity River is a tributary, to the Sacramento River Basin. Construction of the TRD of the CVP was completed in 1963, and it commenced operations in 1964. See 65 Fed. Reg. 69510, at 69571, 2000 WL 1711646 (Nov. 17, 2000). primarily consists of the Trinity Dam and Powerplant, Clair Engle Lake, Lewiston Dam, Lake, and Powerplant; Clear Creek Tunnel, Judge Francis Carr Powerhouse, Clair A. Hill Whiskeytown Dam and Whiskeytown Lake, Spring Creek Power Conduit and Powerplant, and Spring Creek Debris Dam and Reservoir. Its primary function was to store Trinity River water for regulated diversion to California's Central Valley for agricultural, municipal, and industrial uses. See id. The TRD's construction and operation resulted in the diversion of up to ninety percent (90%) of the average annual discharge into the Trinity River at Lewiston (1,234,000 acre-feet of the 1,396,000 acre-foot inflow), and blocked access to 109 miles of steelhead and salmon spawning and

There are actually three different water district plaintiffs: Westlands; San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority ("San Luis Water"); and San Benito County Water District ("San Benito Water") (collectively "water-districts"). San Luis Water consists of thirty-two public agencies that contract with Reclamation for CVP water for use within the California counties of San Joaquin, Stanislaus, Merced, Fresno, Kings, San Benito, and Santa Clara. See Doc. 38 ¶ 2 (declaration of Daniel Nelson). Westlands and San Benito Water are members of San Luis Water. See id.

rearing habitat. In response to declining fisheries and degraded habitat conditions, Interior decided in 1981 to increase flows into the Trinity River ranging from 140,000 acre-feet to 340,000 acre-feet annually, with reductions in dry and critically In addition, the USFWS was directed to undertake a dry years. Flow Evaluation Study to assess fish habitat at various flows, summarize the effectiveness of other instream and watershed restoration activities, and recommend appropriate flows and other measures necessary to better maintain favorable habitat conditions. The study began in October, 1984 and was completed by a June, 1999, report. In October, 1984, Congress enacted the Trinity River Basin Fish and Wildlife Management Act to restore fish and wildlife populations to pre-TRD levels. This Act provides funding for construction, operation, and maintenance of the eleven-item action plan developed by the Trinity River Task Force in 1982. CVPIA § 3406(b)(23) requires, through the TRD, an annual instream release of not less than 340,000 acre-feet of water into the Trinity River in order to meet Federal trust responsibilities to protect fishery resources of the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Tribes and to meet the fishery restoration goals of the

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Trinity Lake has a storage capacity of 2,448,000 acrefeet, and Lewiston reservoir has a storage capacity of 14,660 acrefeet. Reduced river flows, combined with excessive watershed erosion and encroachment of the river channel by riparian vegetation, caused major changes in the channel morphology resulting in the simplification and degradation of the remaining salmon and steelhead habitat of the Trinity River below the Lewiston Dam, which resulted in rapid declines of salmon and steelhead populations following completion of the TRD.

Public Law 98-541, 98 Stat. 2721.

Management Act. The CVP TRD accounts for between twenty-five and thirty percent (25-30%) of the 2000 MW of CVP-generated annual power. See Doc. 105 ¶ 12.10

The Trinity River Basin is home to protected fish species:
The native anadromous salmonid species of interest in the
mainstem Trinity River and its tributaries include chinook
salmon, coho salmon, and steelhead. Of the three species,
there are two spawning populations of chinook salmon (spring
and fall) and two spawning populations of steelhead (winter
and summer). All anadromous species begin their life in
fresh water, then migrate to the ocean to mature, and return
to spawn in fresh water.

Doc. 42 exhibit I at 3-151 to 3-152 (DEIS). The spring-run chinook migrates in the spring to summer, spawns in the early fall, rears in winter-spring-summer, and makes its habitat for feeding in shallow, slow-moving waters adjacent to higher water velocities. The fall-run chinook migrates in the fall, spawns in the fall, rears in winter-spring-summer, and makes its habitat in the same areas as the spring-run chinook. The winter steelhead migrates in the fall to winter, spawns between February and April, rears year-round, and makes its habitat in areas of clean cobble where there is refuge from high velocities, where

The 340,000 acre-feet release represents the third-lowest unregulated flow on record (over 80 years) in the Trinity River. See TRFEFR at 62-64 & tbl 4.4.

For a more expansive description of the TRD, see Eric Stene, Central Valley Project: Trinity River Division (Fifth Draft), at http://dataweb.usbr.gov/html/trinity.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2001) (last modified Mar. 17, 2001).

juveniles overwinter for one to two or more years. The summer steelhead migrates in the spring to summer, spawns between February and April, rears year-round, and makes its habitat in the same area as its related species. See Doc. 42 exhibit M at 2-103 table 3-10 (FEIS).

In January, 1998, the draft Trinity River Flow Evaluation Report was released. In June, 1999, Interior, in consultation with the Hoopa Valley Tribe, published the Trinity River Flow Evaluation Final Report ("TRFEFR"). See Doc. 42 exhibit H. 11 The TRFEFR recommends increasing the Trinity River fish flows from the statutorily-mandated 340,000 acre-feet/year to between 369,000 and 815,000 acre-feet/year. See Doc. 35 at ¶ 38 (first amended complaint). Specifically, the recommended annual water volumes for instream release are:

Water-Year Class	Instream Volume	Probability of
	(x 1000 more-fast)	Occurrence
Extremely Wet	815.2	0.12
Wet	701.0	0.28
Normal	646.9	0.20
Dry	452.6	0.28
Critically Dry	368.6	0.12
Weighted Average	594.5	///////////////////////////////////////

See also FWS Publications Online, at http://www.nctc.fws.gov/library/pubs3.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2001) (last modified Mar. 15, 2001).

See TRFEFR xxxi; 241.12

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On October 19, 1999, the United States Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") and the United States Fish & Wildlife Service ("USFWS") released the draft "Trinity River Mainstem Fishery Restoration Environmental Impact Statement/Report" ("DEIS"), which described alternate approaches for restoring and maintaining the Trinity River fishery. See Doc. 35 at 9 38; see also Doc. 42 exhibit F (DEIS selected pages); exhibit I (whole DEIS). 13 The six evaluated approaches were the "No Action Alternative" (DEIS § 2.1.2); "Maximum Flow Alternative" (DEIS § 2.1.3); "Flow Evaluation" (DEIS § 2.1.4); "Percent Inflow Alternative" (DEIS § 2.1.5); "Mechanical Restoration Alternative" (DEIS § 2.1.6); and "State Permit Alternative" (DEIS § 2.1.7). See Doc. 42 exhibit I at 2-1 to 2-31. Eight other alternatives were considered, but eliminated (i.e., not fully evaluated) within the DEIS. See id. "The DEIS/EIR identifies a preferred alternative that . . . increase[s] annual [water] releases to the Trinity River through a new water management program that . . . seek[s] to provide a minimum level of water . . . to restore the Trinity River fishery. The preferred alternative is based on the Flow Evaluation Study, an extended study that commenced October,

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The average is weighted, because the calculation takes into account the probability of the occurrence of the type of water year.

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See also Trinity River Draft Environmental Impact
Statement Released for Public Comment ("TR DEIS webpage"), at
http://www.mp.usbr.gov/mp140/news/1999/DOI-TRIN.html (last
modified Oct. 26, 1999) (visited Dec. 14, 2000); FWS Publications
Online, at http://www.nctc.fws.gov/library/pubs3.html (last
visited Mar. 21, 2001) (last modified Mar. 15, 2001)...

1984, and was completed in June, 1999. Under the preferred alternative, an average of 52 percent of the water in the Trinity River would continue to be diverted to the Central Valley based on annual hydrology. The preferred alternative also . . . address[es] upstream habitat, sedimentation, and runoff issues."

TR DEIS webpage. "The Flow Evaluation Alternative, coupled with additional watershed protection efforts (described in the Mechanical Restoration Alternative), was identified as the Preferred Alternative in terms of best meeting the purpose and need and goals and objectives, while also minimizing adverse impacts." DEIS at 2-3.

Interior published the availability of the draft EIS/EIR and the commencement of a public comment period scheduled to end on December 8, 1999. See 64 Fed. Reg. 56364, 1999 WL 827447 (Oct. 19, 1999). The public comment period was extended until January 20, 2000. See 64 Fed. Reg. 67584, 1999 WL 1078497 (Dec. 2, 1999); 64 Fed. Reg. 72357, 1999 WL 1247501 (Dec. 27, 1999).

On January 20, 2000, the water-districts submitted written comments<sup>14</sup> criticizing the draft report, noting, <u>inter alia</u>, that the draft report failed to analyze the preferred alternative's potential adverse environmental impacts on federally-listed endangered or threatened fish species within the Sacramento River system and the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta ("Delta"), and also failed to analyze how these adverse impacts, if any, could be

<sup>&</sup>quot;Comments of the San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority on the Trinity River Mainstem Fishery Restoration Environmental Impact Statement/Environmental Impact Report," dated Jan. 19, 2000.

minimized or avoided. See Doc. 35 at ¶¶ 39-40 & exhibit A.

On March 10, 2000, Westlands and San Luis sent a sixty-day notice of intent to sue to Interior, threatening suit if Interior did not undertake a formal ESA consultation on the TRFEFR. See Doc. 92 exhibit A (declaration of Eric N. Robinson).

On March 29, 2000, Interior forwarded the TRFEFR to Congress, pursuant to CVPIA § 3406(b)(23) ("the Secretary shall forward the recommendations of the Trinity River Flow Evaluation Study . . . to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the Select Committee on Indian Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives. If the Secretary and the Hoopa Valley Tribe concur in these recommendations, any increase to the minimum Trinity River instream fishery releases established under this paragraph and the operating criteria and procedures referred to in subparagraph (A) shall be implemented accordingly."). See Doc. 35 at ¶ 42.

On May 8, 2000, Interior responded to the water-districts' letter, acknowledging that ESA "§ 7 consultation over potential effects to species listed as either threatened or endangered under the ESA... must be accomplished as part of the process of making a decision on the Program." Doc. 92 at exhibit C. It reassured that "no final decision on the Program will be made until both the USFWS and NMFS have issued biological opinions regarding implementation of the Program, and that these opinions will be taken into consideration in making such decisions." Id.

On October 12, 2000, the NMFS formally issued the "Biological Opinion for the Trinity River Mainstem Fishery

Restoration EIS and Its Effects on Southern Oregon/Northern
California Coast Coho Salmon, Sacramento River Winter-run Chinook
Salmon, Central Valley Spring-run Chinook Salmon, and Central
Valley Steelhead" ("NMFS BioOp."). See Doc. 35 at ¶ 43; exhibit
B. This opinion states that implementation of the report will
affect many aspects of the river, including decreased water
flows, and discusses reasonable and prudent measures ("R&PMs") to
minimize or avoid the preferred alternative's impacts on
federally-listed fish. See id. at 43-45.

Also on October 12, 2000, the USFWS issued "Re[-]initiation of Formal Consultation: Biological Opinion of the Effects of Long-term Operation of the Central Valley Project and State Water Project as Modified by Implementing the Preferred Alternative in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Environmental Impact Report for the Trinity River Mainstem Fishery Restoration Program" ("USFWS BioOp"). See id. at ¶ 48 & exhibit C.

On November 17, 2000, Interior published notice of the availability of the final EIS/EIR. See 65 Fed. Reg. 69512, 2000 WL 1711646 (Nov. 17, 2000); see also Doc. 42 exhibit M (final Trinity River Mainstem Fishery Restoration Environmental Impact Statement/Report, State Clearinghouse No. 1994123009, dated October, 2000); FWS Publications Online, at http://www.nctc.fws.gov/library/pubs3.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2001) (last modified Mar. 15, 2001)..

The notice was originally published on October 20, 2000, see 65 Fed. Reg. 63087, 2000 WL 1544855 (Oct. 20, 2000), but was rescinded on October 25, 2000, because the final EIS/EIR had not yet been issued, see 65 Fed. Reg. 63888, 2000 WL 1579932 (Oct. 25, 2000).

On December 14, 2000, the water-districts filed their complaint in this court against defendants, 16 with three claims for relief from:

- (1) "maladministration" of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") 17 by the USFWS;
- (2) maladministration of the ESA by NMFS; and

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(3) violation of the NEPA18 by all defendants.

<u>See Doc. 1</u> 15-24. That same day, plaintiffs sought an emergency court order to enjoin the defendant, Bruce Babbitt (as Secretary of the Interior), from executing a Record of Decision ("ROD")<sup>19</sup>

The defendants are: the United States Department of the Interior ("Interior"); Bruce Babbit (Secretary of Interior), in his official capacity; the United States Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau"); Eluid Martinez (Commissioner of the Bureau) in his official capacity; Lester A. Snow (Regional Director of Interior), in his official capacity; the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS"); Jamie Rappaport Clark (Director of USFWS), in her official capacity; Michael Spear (Operations Manager of the California/Nevada Operations Officer of the USFWS), in his official capacity; the United States Department of Commerce ("Commerce"); Norman Y. Mineta (Secretary of Commerce), in his official capacity; National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS"); Penelope Dalton (Assistant Administrator for the NMFS), in her official capacity; and Rebecca Lent (Regional Administrator for NMFS), in her official capacity. See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 9-21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> <u>See</u> 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321; 4331-35; 4341-47; 4361-70d (2000).

The ROD is intended to document a decision by the Secretary.

At the time of its decision (§ 1506.10) or, if appropriate, its recommendation to Congress, each agency shall prepare a concise public record of decision. The record, which may be integrated into any other record prepared by the agency, including that required by OMB Circular A-95 (Revised) . . , shall:

<sup>(</sup>a) State what the decision was.

<sup>(</sup>b) Identify all alternatives considered by the agency in

with the Hoopa Valley Tribe, scheduled to be signed on Tuesday, December 19, 2000.

The motion for a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") was denied in open court the following afternoon, Friday, December 15, 2000, and the confirming written order was entered on January 30, 2001. See Doc. 85. The TRO was not issued because at the time of the December 15th hearing, Secretary Babbitt had not yet signed the ROD. The signing was scheduled for December 19, 2000. Until the ROD was signed, there was no "final agency action" that Westlands could challenge. See id. at 4-5 (citing W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 1997); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)).

On December 19, 2000, Secretary Babbitt traversed the Trinity River in a Hoopa Valley Tribe canoe, and signed the ROD on the banks of the Trinity River. See Doc. 35 ¶ 51 & exhibit D; Arcata Fish and Wildlife Office Home Page, at http://www.ccfwo.rl.fws.gov/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2001) (last modified Jan. 22, 2001). The ROD directs Interior's agencies "to implement the Preferred Alternative as described in the FEIS/EIR

reaching its decision, specifying the alternative or alternatives which were considered to be environmentally preferable. An agency may discuss preferences among alternatives based on relevant factors including economic and technical considerations and agency statutory missions. An agency shall identify and discuss all such factors including any essential considerations of national policy which were balanced by the agency in making its decision and state how those considerations entered into its decision.

(c) State whether all practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm from the alternative selected have been adopted, and if not, why they were not. A monitoring and enforcement program shall be adopted and summarized where applicable for any mitigation.

and as provided below," <u>Doc. 35</u> exhibit D at 2, and "to implement the reasonable and prudent measures described in the NMFS and [USFWS] Biological Opinions," <u>id.</u> at 11. The Senior Chairman of the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council also signed the ROD. <u>See id.</u> at 26.

On January 5, 2001, the water-districts filed a first amended complaint ("FAC"), alleging four causes of action:

- (1) maladministration of the ESA by the USFWS, claiming that by "issuing a non-jeopardy biological opinion that requires a major change in CVP operations [i.e., preventing any upstream movement of 0.5 km or more of the X2 water quality standard], the USFWS has exceeded its authority under the Endangered Species Act," see Doc. 35 ¶¶ 60-68;
- (2) maladministration of the ESA by NMFS, claiming that NMFS acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and in excess of its authority under the ESA, by issuing a biological opinion that internally conflicts, because it states on one hand that "NMFS does not anticipate that implementation of the proposed flow schedules will incidentally take any SONCC coho salmon," and on the other hand, prescribes R&PMs to deal with incidental takes, see id. at ¶ 69-76;
- (3) violation of NEPA by all defendants, claiming that: (a) the draft and final EIS/EIRs do not analyze the impacts of implementing the requirements of the USFWS and NMFS biological opinions; (b) the final EIS/EIR does not adequately describe what CVP operational changes will occur to protect, or mitigate the adverse effect upon, listed fish upon which the draft EIS/EIR acknowledges implementation of

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the preferred alternative may have a significant adverse impact, simply deferring mitigation consideration until later; (c) because the biological opinions modified the proposed action by creating new environmental impacts (or new circumstances and information), the defendants failed to supplement the EIS/EIRs to analyze these impacts and publish the analysis for public comment; (d) the draft and final EIS/EIR do not fairly evaluate alternatives, and are in essence a "post hoc rationalization to justify a course of action decided upon before NEPA review even began; " (e) the EIS/EIRs utilize improper definitions of proper purpose by using the "healthy river," rather than an objective, standard; and (f) the final EIS/EIR, or a supplement thereto, does not analyze the impact of implementation of the preferred alternative on California's current energy crisis, see id. at ¶¶ 77-82; and

(4) violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), claiming that the TRFEFR's recommendations adopted by the ROD are not based on the best available scientific data in violation of CVPIA § 3406(b)(23)(A); and other conclusions contained therein are arbitrary and capricious, see id. at ¶¶ 83-88.

They request: (1) an order to set aside and vacate the TRFEFR, the ROD, and the BioOps as unlawful agency actions; (2) a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from implementing the ROD or enforcing the BioOps; (3) a preliminary injunction to prohibit the defendants from releasing in excess of 340,000 acre-feet from the Trinity River instream until adequate

flow studies, EIS/EIRs, and BioOps are issued; and (4) attorney's fees and costs. See id. at 28-29.20

In support of their motion for a preliminary injunction, the water-district plaintiffs submitted declarations from: Daniel Nelson (Doc. 38); John Gregg (Doc. 39); Daniel J. O'Hanlon (Doc. 40); Thaddeus L. Bettner (Doc. 41); and James Snow (Doc. 42). The Snow declaration has thirteen exhibits, comprising thousands of pages.

In support of its sixty-seven (67) page opposition to the preliminary injunction, the government submitted seven volumes, also comprising thousands of pages, including declarations from: Martin A. Bauer (Doc. 69); Stephen Hatchett (Doc. 70); David Marcus (Doc. 71); fishery biologist Joseph C. Polos (Doc. 72); Janice M. Schneider (Doc. 73); Charles R. Shockey (Doc. 74); Michael G. Thabault (Doc. 75); fishery biologist Paul A. Zedonis (Doc. 76); Doctor William J. Trush (Doc. 75); Chester V. Bowling (Doc. 69); Thomas "Tom" Dang (Doc. 69); Jay D. Glase (Doc. 69); Derek Hilts (Doc. 70); Scott M. McBain (Doc. 70); Mary Ellen Mueller (Doc. 71); Mark Oliver (Doc. 71); Lloyd Peterson (Doc. 71); Donald R. Reck (Doc. 72); and Gary R. Stern (Doc. 74).

In support of their reply for preliminary injunction, the water-districts filed supplemental declarations of James Snow (Doc. 90); and Thaddeus L. Bettner (Doc. 91); and the declaration of Eric N. Robinson (Doc. 92). Westlands also requests judicial notice of: (1) Interior's Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS/EIR for the Mainstem Trinity River Fisher Restoration, 59 Fed. Reg. 51607, dated October 12, 1994 (exhibit A); (2) certified copy of California Governor Gray Davis' Emergency Proclamation, dated January 17, 2001 (exhibit B); (3) Interior's departmental manual, part 516, national Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Chapter 4, dated September 26, 1984 (exhibit C); (4) Interior's Notice of proposed revised procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 52212, dated August 28, 2000 (exhibit D); (5) the fact that on January 17, and 18, 2001, northern California experienced rolling blackouts. See Doc. 93.

In support of its motion for a preliminary injunction, NCPA filed declarations of fisheries biologist Paul Bratovich (Doc. 31); and professional engineer George "Buzz" Link (Doc. 32). In support of its reply, NCPA filed the supplemental declaration of Roger A. Fontes (Doc. 103).

In support of its motion for a preliminary injunction, SMUD filed declarations of: operations engineer Heather B. Lee; Brian Jobson (Doc. 112); Charles H. Hanson, Ph.D. (Doc. 113); professional engineer Paul G. Scheuerman (Doc. 114); Michael D. Harvey, Ph.D. (Doc. 115); Eddy Lim (Doc. 116); and professional engineer George "Buzz" Link (Doc. 117). In support of its reply, SMUD filed reply declarations of: Brian Jobson (Doc. 95); George "Buzz" Link (Doc. 96); Eddy Lim (Doc. 97); Charles H. Hanson (Doc. 98); and Paul G. Scheuerman (Doc. 99).

On February 8, 2001, the NCPA and the SMUD were granted leave to intervene as plaintiffs of right in this action under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, over the opposition of the Hoopa Valley and Yurok Tribes. See Doc. 118.

The present controversy is whether a preliminary injunction should issue to preclude the government from implementing the preferred alternative (the "Flow Evaluation") of the TRFEFR under the ROD, which, inter alia, increases annual water releases into the Trinity River. Plaintiffs argue implementation of the ROD violates the NEPA, the ESA, and the APA, alleging no sufficient or timely environmental review was conducted of either the adverse effects of the preferred alternative of the TRFEFR, the changes imposed by the two BioOps published thereafter, or their effects in light of the changed circumstances caused by California's current energy crisis.

#### II. STANDARD

#### A. <u>Preliminary Injunction</u>

Two alternative tests exist to determine whether and when a preliminary injunction should issue.<sup>22</sup> The "traditional test" requires a plaintiff to establish:

(1) the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to

NCPA's complaint-in-intervention, previously lodged on January 05, 2001, was filed on February 06, 2001. See Doc. 105. SMUD's complaint-in-intervention, previously lodged on January 05, 2001, was filed on February 06, 2001. See Doc. 109.

The standards for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a preliminary injunction are essentially identical. See City of Tenakee Springs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1402, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985).

plaintiff if the injunction is not granted;

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- (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction would inflict on the defendant;
- (3) the probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and
- (4) the public interest favors granting the injunction. See 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure \$ 2948 (1995 & 2000 Supp.) ("Federal Practice & Procedure"); see also Textile Unlimited, Inc. v. A..BMH & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football <u>League</u>, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980)); <u>Am. Motorcyclist</u> Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1983); Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 637, 639 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Some courts condense the latter three factors into a single element, which weighs the relative balance of hardships to the plaintiff, the defendant, and the public. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1988). "However, the Ninth Circuit primarily employs the 'alternative' two-prong test applied by the Second Circuit, which provides that a preliminary injunction may be granted if the movant demonstrates either: (1) a probability of success on the merits and irreparable injury, or (2) serious questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor." 13 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice §§ 65.22[5][i][i] (3d ed. 2000) ("Moore's") (citing cases); see also Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (en

banc) (citing Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1998), aff'd, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)); Gentala v. City of Tucson, 213 F.3d 1055, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2000) (same).23 The two alternatives in the above test should not be treated as separate tests, but rather as opposite ends of a continuum in which the necessity for showing "irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases." Gentala, 213 F.3d at 1060-61 (quoting Roe, 134 F.3d at 1402); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 868 F.2d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989)).24 "A preliminary injunction is not a preliminary adjudication on the merits, but a device for preserving the status quo and preventing the irreparable loss of rights before judgment." Textile 

See also Greenpeace Found. v. Daley, 122 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1122 (D. Haw. 2000) ("The conventional test for granting a preliminary injunction requires the moving party to demonstrate: '(1) a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation, and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the party seeking relief.'") (quoting Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir. 1987))) (alteration marks omitted).

The basis for injunctive relief (preliminary or permanent) in the federal courts has always been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982); Stanley v. U.S.C., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994). Under either the traditional or the reformed approach, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show that it is "likely" to prevail on the merits. See Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1431, 1432 (11th Cir. 1995). As part of the balancing of factors, the competing claims of injury must be weighed and the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief considered. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).

Unlimited, Inc., 240 F.3d at 786 (citing Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984)).

The district court is vested with reasonable discretion when determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("A district court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion.") (citing Bay Area Addiction Research & Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 732 (9th Cir. 1999))).

#### III. DISCUSSION

# A. Preliminary Injunction ("PI")

The water-districts, NCPA, and SMUD seek a preliminary injunction to prohibit the Secretary of the Interior from implementing the Preferred Alternative identified in the ROD, on the ground that they will suffer great harm if it is implemented, because less CVP water and electricity will be available to them under their water-service contracts with Interior, and the issuance of the TRFEFR, the draft and final EIS/EIRs, and the BioOps, and implementation of the ROD, are all in violation of the ESA, the NEPA, and the APA.

#### 1. Test

Plaintiffs must either show: probability of success on the merits and irreparable injury; or alternatively, raise serious questions going to the merits and demonstrate the balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor. See Gentala, 213 F.3d at

'fair chance of success on the merits.'" EBay v. Bidder's Edge,
Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 1058, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting Sierra
On-Line, Inc., 739 F.2d at 1421). "Generally, the 'balance of
harm' evaluation should precede the 'likelihood of success
analysis' because until the balance of harm has been evaluated
the court cannot know how strong and substantial the plaintiff's
showing of the likelihood of success must be." Id. (citing
Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d at 1389); see also 11A
Federal Practice & Procedure \$ 2948.1, at 139 ("Perhaps the
single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction is a demonstration that if it is not
granted the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before
a decision on the merits can be rendered.").

Plaintiffs point to American Motorcyclist Ass'n, 714 F.2d at 962, for the proposition that the "burden of establishing irreparable harm is lessened when a violation of the [NEPA] is alleged." Doc. 37 at 14:4-7 (citing id. at 965-66 ("the presence of strong NEPA claims gives rise to more liberal standards for granting an injunction") (emphasis in original) (citing cases)). This is the law in the Ninth Circuit. However, this more generous standard, i.e., presumption for granting injunctions when NEPA violations purportedly exist, does not apply in the "unusual" circumstances where "enjoining government action allegedly in violation of NEPA might actually jeopardize natural resources." Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 n.16 (9th Cir. 1984) (discussing Am. Motorcyclist Ass'n, where an injunction did not issue although the desert conservation plan

probably violated NEPA, because granting the injunction would likely harm, rather than protect, the environment) (citing Alpine Lake Prot. Soc'y v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1975) (refusing to grant injunction because "unusual circumstances" meant more harm could occur to forest from disease if injunction granted)).

This is the situation here: plaintiffs want to enjoin implementation of the ROD, which implements the preferred alternative of the TRFEFR, for alleged procedural timing violations of the NEPA, even though the ROD protects the environment by increasing River flows to enhance the salmonid habitat and satisfies the five-year overdue statutory mandate to restore the Trinity River fisher. Plaintiffs' predominant harm is potential loss of water or electricity for non-environmental uses. As evaluated below, enjoining any implementation of the ROD may possibly harm the species within the Trinity River ecosystem. The lower threshold showing for issuance of preliminary injunctions when a NEPA violation is alleged does not apply given the facts of this case.

# 2. PI Factor-1: Irreparable Injury

Plaintiffs assert they will suffer primarily two types of imminent, irreparable harm if the preferred alternative is implemented. First, the water-districts argue that under the ROD's flow regime (which implements the TRFEFR's preferred alternative), they will receive less, possibly considerably less,

water than now, which cannot be recovered once lost. See Doc. 37 23-24. Second, all plaintiffs claim that they may not receive their present allotment of subsidized CVP electricity, which will also be diminished under the preferred alternative, thereby mandating that they purchase that lost amount of electricity in the open market, at a substantially higher price than they currently pay for CVP-generated electricity. See id. at 24.

The government rejoins that "virtually all forms of the injuries alleged involve financial and monetary costs, which by their nature are not irreparable for purposes of injunctive relief." Doc. 68 56.26 Regarding the threatened loss of water, the government argues that: (1) implementation of the ROD will not alter Trinity Water flows until late April; (2) based on the current forecasts that water year 2001-2002 will be critically dry, the total lost water to all south-of-delta CVP water contractors will be minimal, only 29,000 acre-feet; 27 and (3) the water-districts will not suffer the entire yearly threatened

In its opposition to the TRO, the Government argued that the harm, dissipation of water, was not sufficiently immediate, because it would not occur until February or April, 2001. See 12/15/2000 Declarations of Chester V. Bowling and Michael J. Ryan. The is specious, as the Bureau well knows, because the pre-Irrigation season has commenced, and water use continues to intensify in spring and summer months.

The government also contends that the energy costs used by the plaintiffs to calculate the potential injury (higher electric bills) are "significantly overstated." <u>See id.</u> at 58:17.

Presumably, the government derives this figure by subtracting the current, statutorily-mandated flow diversion (340,000 acre-feet) from the TRFEFR's proposed figure during a critically-dry year (368,600), which actually equals an additional 28,600 acre-feet.

reduction, because not issuing the injunction will only impact the water that may be lost during the pendency of this case (between the date of this hearing or initial flow alteration (late April) and the date when the final ruling on the merits issues), which according to the federal defendants should be as early as August 1, 2001. See id. & n.31.

According to Mr. Snow, implementation of the ROD will reduce Westlands' long-term average CVP water supply by approximately 57,000 acre-feet/year, which represents an average five percent<sup>28</sup> reduction to all south-of-Delta water contractors. See Doc. 42 at ¶ 8. The impact is further exaggerated when a dry or critically-dry year follows a wet year, because the amount of CVP water storage for the following year is also reduced. See id. at ¶ 11; exhibit B (containing graph that models water reductions under the ROD). For example, Mr. Snow declares that when a dry year follows a wetter year, the average annual delivery of CVP water to south-of-Delta water contractors will be reduced by 286,000 acre-feet, of which Westlands will lose the majority, 172,000 acre-feet. See id. After comparing the two possible alternatives (either reduced deliveries or additional releases of

Implementation of the ROD will reduce CVP water deliveries by approximately 65,000 acre-feet, which is approximately 3.5% of the total 1,900,000 acre-feet for south-of-Delta agricultural service contractual entitlements  $(65,000/1,900,000\ \cong\ 0.0342)$ . Because the Bureau only allocates CVP water in five-percent increments, and Westlands has entitlement to sixty percent of the 1,900,000 acre-feet delivered south of the Delta, Mr. Snow alleges Westlands will suffer a five percent or approximately 57,000 acre-feet/year reduction  $(0.05\ x\ 0.60\ x\ 1,900,000\ =\ 57,000)$ .

REPMs, Mr. Snow argues such compliance will cause additional "significant" water supply reductions to Westlands. See id. at ¶ 19.29 Mr. Bettner writes that such water reductions will result in fallowed land, because pumping for additional groundwater cannot fully compensate the lost CVP water, and other sources mentioned by the government are unreliable and/or impossible to tap. See Doc. 41 ¶¶ 10-15.

Westlands also has contracts for CVP-generated power. Doc. 41 exhibit B (Contract Nos. 14-06-200-3131A and 7-07-20-P0003, "Contract for Electric Service to Westlands Water District, " dated Dec. 1, 1966, and Sept. 30, 1977). According to Mr. Bettner, implementation of the ROD results in a range of CVP power reduction from one percent (01%) in wet years to ten percent (10%) in critically-dry periods, averaging a four percent (04%) loss of CVP-generated electricity to Westlands, 10,091 MegaWatt hours ("Mwh"), in a normal water year, which he posits will cost \$1,105,548/year to replace (a twenty-percent cost increase). <u>See id.</u> at ¶ 22; exhibit E. The government challenges this projected cost of the replacement electricity, claiming that the prices Mr. Bettner used are not representative of market prices, especially because year-2000 electricity prices are not typical: "they are the result, according to FERC and

After examining the draft EIS's modeling results for a sixty-nine-year-period comparison of X2 movement with the Trinity flow, Mr. Snow notes the X2 standard will be violated in seven percent (07%) of all February months; one percent (01%) of all March and April months; and twenty percent (20%) of all June months. See id.

others, of market design rather than underlying economic costs," and "they represent the effect of demand unconstrained by having to actually pay the market prices." See Doc. 71 ¶¶ 7-18 (declaration of David Marcus).

SMUD also alleges injury from a diminished supply of electricity, contending that less CVP-generated electricity will be available, which will exacerbate California's energy crisis.

See Doc. 116 ¶¶ 9-25 (declaration of Eddy Lim). Specifically, it will suffer "an increase in frequency, magnitude and duration of load curtailments" to its customers, see id. at ¶ 26, and overall, the lost available CVP-generated electricity represents an additional cost of \$24,000,000, with SMUD bearing \$7,000,000, see id. at ¶ 28. The government debates the validity of these estimates. See Doc. 69 (declaration of Thomas "Tom" Dang); Doc. 71 (Marcus declaration).

NCPA furnishes electricity to approximately 700,000 customers in northern and central California. See Doc. 107 2:7-8. It alleges that "alarming increases in mortality of all four chinook salmon runs in the Sacramento River occur with implementation of the Preferred Alternative." See Doc. 31 at \$\frac{4}{4}(a)\$ (declaration of fisheries biologist Paul Bratovich). For example, Mr. Bratovich opines that a ten-percent (10%) mortality increase for fall-run chinnok salmon occurs in fifty-five percent (55%) of the sixty-nine years modeled under the preferred alternative, up to a high of 100.3 percent in 1947. See id. at 3:22-4:5. Similar mortality increases are experienced for the other chinook salmon runs (greater than 10% mortality increase occurs 51% of time for late-fall-run chinook salmon, with a high

of 507.8% in 1939; greater than 10% mortality increase occurs 57% of time for winter-run chinook salmon, with a high of 348.8% in 1932; greater than 10% mortality increase occurs 57% of time for spring-run chinook salmon, with a high of 107.9% in 1947). See Additionally, NCPA notes that the government has id. at 4:5-28. not adequately considered the "interdependence" of the Trinity and Sacramento Rivers, such that an additional increase in Trinity down-flow must be compensated by an increased Sacramento River supplemental release, because the X2 salinity standards must be maintained. See Doc. 105 ¶ 10 (NCPA complaint-inintervention). For example, Mr. Link declares that implementation of the preferred alternative will conflict with other regulatory constraints placed on the operational CVP, such as water temperature restrictions at Red Bluff Diversion Dam that will be violated by cold-water exports to the Sacramento River through Spring Creek Power Plant. See Doc. 32 at ¶ 4 (declaration of George "Buzz" Link). Aside from the risk to the listed threatened or endangered species, NCPA also alleges injury from reduced available CVP-generated electricity, contending that the EIS/EIRs did not conduct a detailed assessment regarding the loss of CVP power on California as a whole. See id. at ¶¶ 11-21.30

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Last, implementation of the ROD (implementing the preferred alternative of the TRFEFR) may also harm listed fish in the TRD:

There would be significant adverse impacts to Sacramento River fall (1 percent) and winter (2 percent) chinook salmon

NCPA asserts that diversion of one acre-foot of Trinity River water reduces CVP power by 1100kWh. See id. at ¶ 5.

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runs. . . . Similar to the case for the Maximum Flow Alternative, increased losses of eggs and sac-fry fall chinook salmon would occur as a result of increased water temperatures during drought conditions (1924, 1931 through 1934, and 1977). These temperature increases would result in higher mortality, compared to No Action, of incubating and developing salmon eggs and pre-emergent fry life stages.

Doc. 42 exhibit I at 3-176 & table 3-15 (DEIS).31

Plaintiffs adequately establish the probability of irreparable injury: lost water for current deliveries and shortage, which cannot be replaced; and additionally, a potential for electrical energy loss, which will adversely impact the human environment as well as salmonid species in the Sacramento River.

On the other side of the calculus, the government argues the environment will suffer if the ROD is not implemented, i.e., degradation of the Trinity River will continue. According to fisheries biologist Mr. Glase, Mr. Hanson's statement that salmonid species returns to the Trinity River have been abundant in recent years is misleading, because in most of those years, the abundant returns are dominated by fish produced by the

The final EIS/EIR did not alter this passage from the draft EIS/EIR.

The government's argument regarding the "limited" time the plaintiffs would suffer if the injunction is erroneously not issued, see Doc. 68 at 56 & n.31 ("Federal defendants submit that the case can be litigated and perhaps decided on the merits as early as August 1, 2001."), actually operates against them regarding balance of hardship, because it is the party seeking to alter the status quo, i.e., to increase annual Trinity River flow releases to over 340,000 acre-feet, which has existed for quite some time.

Trinity River Hatchery, and not naturally-produced fish from within the Trinity River. See Doc. 69  $\P$  8 (declaration of Jay D. Glase); see also Doc. 42 exhibit H at E-3 to E-5 (TRFEFR tables showing number of fall-run and spring chinook spawning escapement and origin of spawners). The government cites the declarations of fisheries biologists Joseph C. Polos and Donald R. Reck in support of its argument that the listed species continue to be depressed. See Doc. 68 at 64. For example, the Trinity River naturally-produced coho salmon, which have a three-year life cycle, "are at extremely[-]low population levels," averaging only 202 adults returning past Willow Creek annually from 1991-1995. See Doc. 72 3 (declaration of Donald R. Reck). "The current average annual run of naturally[-]produced Trinity River coho salmon represent only 14 percent of the Trinity Restoration Project goal established in 1983," id., with the "more alarming . . . extremely high proportion (>90%) of hatchery fish making up the coho run, " id. at ¶ 21 (declaration of Joseph C. Polos). Although Mr. Polos writes that "[c]ontinuation of the 340,000 acre-feet release into the Trinity River will contribute to the continued degradation of the fishery habitats of the river and the suppression of its anadromous salmonid populations due to poor freshwater production, " because the "340,000 acre-feet allocation has not been sufficient to sustain the riverine habitats that supported healthy naturally[-]producing salmonid populations," id. at ¶ 22 (Polos), none of the government's declarants alleges irreparable injury, even if they argue that implementation of the ROD's recommendations is essential. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 11 (Reck) ("Failure to implement the [ROD] flows

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beginning in mid-April 2001 will delay indefinitely the critical survival benefits to coho salmon smolts associated with improved water temperatures and decreased migration travel time, as previous [sic] described. In turn, the decreased survival of outmigrating smolts in 2001 is likely to further decrease the number of returning adult spawners and continue the steep trend of adversely affecting the production of future brood years and the resiliency of the population.\*).

The balance of hardships favors plaintiffs, the party demonstrating irreparable harm, especially because they seek to maintain the status quo, see, e.g., Textile Unlimited, Inc., 240 F.3d at 786 ("A preliminary injunction is . . . a device for preserving the status quo and preventing the irreparable loss of rights before judgment.") (citing case).

# 3. PI Factor-2: Success on the Merits

Although plaintiffs demonstrate a colorable showing of irreparable harm (irretrievably lost CVP water and electrical energy)<sup>33</sup> that outweighs any showing of harm by the government, before a preliminary injunction will issue, plaintiffs must also

It is not clear that the lost CVP-generated electricity alone suffices for irreparable injury, because this threatened loss appears solely monetary (higher-cost electricity), i.e., it is not asserted that there is no alternate energy available at any price. See, e.g., Am. Tunaboat Ass'n v. Brown, 67 F.3d 1404, 1411 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Injury of a strictly monetary nature generally is not cognizable as a basis for issuing an injunction when balanced against the possibility of irreparable injury to marine mammals.") (citing Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F.Supp. 964, 975 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991)). If energy cannot be obtained and power consumers are directly deprived, the injury is more serious. The lost water cannot effectively be replaced.

show that they have a "fair chance" of prevailing at trial. See EBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1064. Put another way, "[a]t the very least, 'it must be shown as an irreducible minimum that there is a fair chance of success on the merits.'" San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230, 1234 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Stanley v. U.S.C., 13 F.3d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Martin v. Int'l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 686 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Benda v. Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 584 F.2d 308, 315 (9th Cir. 1978) (citing McCormick v. Claytor, 441 F.Supp. 622 (D. Or. 1977))))). Plaintiffs are not required to make as strong a showing of likely success on the merits, however, because their possible harm exceeds that of the defendants, see Gentala, 213 F.3d at 1060-61, and they seek to maintain, rather than alter, the status quo, see, e.g., Textile Unlimited, Inc., 240 F.3d at 786.

The gravamen of plaintiffs' argument is that the government performed environmental review of its proposed action too late, or incompletely: (1) the government did not timely perform an EIS/EIR of the draft TRFER, so when it filed and submitted the TRFEFR to Congress, it did so in violation of NEPA, because no prior NEPA review of the adverse effects of it had been conducted (such review plaintiffs argue was not completed until later in the FEIS, in October, 2000); (2) because the government performed evaluations of the impacts of implementation of the preferred alternative of the TRFEFR in the NMFS and USFWS BioOps, issued October 12, 2000, which plaintiffs claim impose independent

changes to the ROD and TRFEFR that are likely to cause additional adverse environmental impacts,<sup>34</sup> the government violated NEPA by not conducting further review of the adverse effects of those BioOps, which plaintiffs claim are so closely "connected to" the TRFEFR's preferred alternative adopted by the ROD (and mandated by the ROD to be implemented),<sup>35</sup> that a single EIS/EIR should have evaluated all of these actions as one, citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a);<sup>36</sup> and (3) the government violated NEPA by not completing a supplemental EIS to evaluate the effects of implementation of the ROD's increased water releases in light of the changed circumstances caused by California's current energy crisis. See Doc. 37.<sup>37</sup>

See Doc. 42 ¶¶ 17-19 (Snow declaration) (describing the effects of the BioOps that have not been evaluated under NEPA).

See <u>Doc. 35</u> exhibit D at 11 ("the Department's agencies are directed, through the Trinity Management Council, to implement the Perferred Alternative as described in the FEIS/EIS and to implement the reasonable and prudent measures described in the NMFS and Service Biological Opinions.") (emphasis added).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a) (2000) states:

<sup>(</sup>a) Agencies shall make sure the proposal which is the subject of an environmental impact statement is properly defined. Agencies shall use the criteria for scope (§ 1508.25) to determine which proposal(s) shall be the subject of a particular statement.

Proposals or parts of proposals which are related to each other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall be evaluated in a single impact statement.

Id. (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs also challenge the substance of the government's decision, arguing that any environmental review conducted was a "post hoc rationalization to justify a course of action decided upon before NEPA review even began," because such review was done after the government had already decided which course it was taking, as shown by the submission of the TRFEFR to Congress in early 2000, and did not fairly evaluate alternative

In response to the first argument, the government contends that "Interior commenced the formal NEPA process . . . six years ago" when it published a Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS before the TRFES was completed. See Doc. 68 25 (incorrectly citing 59 Fed. Reg. 25141); 38 Doc. 35 exhibit D 8 (ROD). 39 In response to the second alleged violation of NEPA (not evaluating the BioOps' changes), the government begins by attempting to distinguish Westlands Water Dist. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 850 F.Supp. 1388 (E.D. Cal. 1994), on which plaintiffs rely, as a case where the BioOps at issue were "part of a systematic and connected set of agency decisions" that resulted in the reallocation of over 225,000 acre feet of CVP water for salmon protection with alleged adverse environmental impacts, as

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proposals or the objections plaintiffs submitted. They argue, therefore, that the adoption of the preferred alternative was arbitrary and capricious, and in violation of both the NEPA and ESA

The correct citation is 59 Fed. Reg. 51607, 1994 WL 551677 (Oct. 12, 1994).

<sup>&</sup>quot;Pursuant to section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970, as amended, the Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) and the Hoopa Valley Tribe propose to prepare a draft environmental impact statement/environmental impact report (EIS/EIR) to evaluate mainstem Trinity River fishery restoration projects and to assist the Secretary of the Interior in developing recommendations for permanent instream fishery flow requirements and Trinity River Division operating criteria and procedures for the restoration and maintenance of the Trinity River Fishery, Trinity River Division, Central Valley Project (CVP), California. Such recommendations are required by the Flow Evaluation Program, authorized by a January 14, 1981, Secretarial Directive, and for Section 3406(b)23(A) of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) dated October 30, 1992." 59 Fed. Reg. 51607 (Oct. 13, 1994).

compared to this case, which the government claims is different because: (1) that case ruled on a motion to dismiss, where the more lenient standard applied (accepting Westlands' allegations as true); and (2) in that case, the Bureau had not performed any NEPA compliance, e.g., an EA or EIS/EIR, before proposing an adjustment in the water allocations, whereas here, extensive NEPA review was conducted before the recommendation was presented to Congress, the BioOps issued, and the ROD was signed. See Doc. 68 at 26-27. Last, the government argues that the energy concerns are not as serious as the plaintiffs paint them, and do not require an SEIS.

# 4. Application

A party seeking to challenge governmental action as violating NEPA must use the APA, because the NEPA does not afford a private right of action. See Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 2000 WL 33152061, \*4 n.2 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 2001) ("Although NEPA does not provide a private right of action for violations of its provisions, private parties may enforce the requirements of NEPA by bringing an action against the federal agency under § 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act.") (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702; Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-83 (1990)). "To demonstrate statutory standing under the APA, a plaintiff must (1) identify a final agency action; and (2) show that the injury complained of 'falls within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the basis of the complaint.'" ONRC Action v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 150 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1998)

(quoting <u>Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson</u>, 32 F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting <u>Lujan</u>, 497 U.S. at 882)).

# a. Final Action

"The Supreme Court in <u>Bennett</u> set forth a two-part test for determining whether an agency action was final for the purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act: (1) the action had to mark the consummation of the agency's decision-making process; and (2) the action had to be one from where rights or obligations have been determined or from where legal consequences will flow."

<u>Am. Rivers v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.</u>, 126 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing <u>Bennett</u>, 520 U.S. at 177).

Here, final action occurred when Interior (through its Secretary, Babbitt) and the Hoopa Valley Tribe signed the Trinity River ROD at the shore of the Trinity River on December 19, 2000. That signing represents the consummation of Interior's decision-making process (it agreed to implement the TRFEFR's preferred alternative adopted in the ROD and EIR/EISs, with no other action required by Interior), especially under CVPIA § 3406(b)(23) (requiring the agreed-upon alternative of the TRFEFR to be implemented after the government and Hoopa Valley Tribe so concur). It is major federal action that significantly affects, inter alia, CVP water, electricity, and environmental interests.<sup>40</sup>

Under certain specific circumstances, not present here, issuance of a biological opinion may itself qualify as final agency action subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1996). See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177-79; see also, e.g., Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's

# b. National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") 41

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The "NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS for 'major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the

Ass'n, 71 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1066-67 (W.D. Wash. 1999) ("A [Fisheries] biological opinion is a final agency action that may be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act") (citing id. at 174); Greenpeace v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1260 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (holding that Fisheries' biological opinion regarding interaction between fisheries and Steller sea lion population was final agency action for purposes of judicial review pursuant to the APA) (citing Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178); In Bennett, ranchers and irrigation districts challenged a biological opinion issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service pursuant to the ESA. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 157. Petitioners were water users of a water reclamation project administered by Reclamation. See id. The Fish and Wildlife Service's biological opinion recommended to Reclamation that, in order to avoid jeopardy to certain endangered fish, a "reasonable and prudent alternative" was to maintain minimum water levels in certain reservoirs, causing, in the aggregate, a reduction in the water available for use by the petitioners and others. See id. at The government argued that no causation existed, because 159-60. any reduction in water allocated to petitioners resulted, not from the biological opinion, but from Reclamation's independent decision, an entity that was not a party to the lawsuit and that was not legally bound to follow the biological opinion. at 168-69. The Supreme Court disagreed.

[The government's argument] wrongly equates injury "fairly traceable" to the defendant with injury as to which the defendant's actions are the very last step in the chain of causation. While, as we have said, it does not suffice if the injury complained of is the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court, that does not exclude injury produced by determinative or coercive effect upon the actions of someone else.

<u>Id.</u> (internal quotations and citations omitted) (further noting the near certainty that agency officials will follow Fish and Wildlife Service's biological opinions).

Westlands challenges the biological opinions in this case as not complying with NEPA. The APA does not permit such action.

The purposes of the NEPA are to: "declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation." 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1995).

human environment,'" Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434, 442 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)), 42 which "ensures that federal agencies are informed of environmental consequences before making decisions and that the information is available to the public, " Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 473 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 1996)). The "NEPA does not mandate particular substantive results, but instead imposes only procedural requirements." Id. (quoting Laguna Greenbelt, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978))).43 "NEPA is a procedural statute. Its purpose is to ensure informed agency action. Accordingly, it requires only that the agency take a 'hard look' at its decision, and not that environmental concerns trump all others." Swanson v. United States Forest

In <u>Ramsey</u>, Fisheries issued a biological opinion and incidental take statement governing permissible incidental take of federally-listed chinook salmon. <u>See id.</u> at 438-39. The court held that although not a permit, "the incidental take statement . . . is functionally equivalent to a permit," so "issuance of that statement constitutes major federal action for purposes of NEPA." <u>Id.</u> at 444. The Ninth Circuit "conclude[d] that the National Marine Fisheries Service, the federal agency that issued the incidental take statement, was required by law to comply with the requirements of NEPA before issuing the statement." <u>Id.</u>

The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") promulgates regulations that ensure that federal agencies meet their obligations under the NEPA. See, e.g., About CEQ, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/about.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2001) (last modified Feb. 22, 2001). 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-08 are applicable to and binding on all Federal agencies for implementing the procedural provisions of the NEPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 (2000).

Serv., 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted). Courts "review an EIS under a 'rule of reason' to determine whether it contains a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences." Okanogan Highlands Alliance, 236 F.3d at 473 (quoting City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. United States Dep't of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 1997))

The NEPA also requires the federal agency in certain situations to consider changed circumstances or additional information by filing a supplemental EIS ("SEIS"):

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In view of this purpose, an agency that has prepared an EIS cannot simply rest on the original document. The agency must be alert to new information that may alter the results of its original environmental analysis, and continue to take a "hard look at the environmental effects of its planned action, even after a proposal has received initial approval." It must "make a reasoned decision based on ... the significance -- or lack of significance -- of the new information," and prepare a supplemental EIS when there are "significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts." "If there remains major Federal action to occur, and the new information is sufficient to show that the remaining action will affect the quality of the human environment in a significant manner or to a significant extent not already considered, a supplemental EIS must be prepared."

Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 557-58 (9th

Cir. 2000) (internal citations, alteration marks, and footnote omitted). The decision to forego preparing an SEIS will not be set aside unless it was arbitrary or capricious. See id. at 556 (citing Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)).

First, plaintiffs argue the government violated the NEPA by failing to complete NEPA review prior to issuing the TRFEFR, i.e., the timing of the draft and final EIS/EIRs. See Doc. 37

14. The government rejoins that the final action was not the submission of the TRFEFR to Congress, which it argues was "far removed from the culmination of the final decision process," and solely a "scientific report to Congress," not requiring independent NEPA review because it was not a recommendation or report on proposals for legislation, but rather, the only final action was the signing of the ROD on December 19, 2000. See Doc. 68 at 23-24. It argues that "Westlands overlooks the fact that Interior commenced the formal NEPA process to develop and assess alternatives aimed at restoring the Trinity River mainstem fishery six years ago . . ., well before the TRFES was completed." Id. at 25:20-23.

NEPA § 102(2)(C) requires that federal agencies "include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed [EIS]." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000). "'Major Federal action' includes actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility," 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2000), including "[a]doption of formal plans, such as official

documents prepared or approved by federal agencies which guide or prescribe alternative uses of federal resources, upon which future agency actions will be based, " id. at § 1508.18(b)(2)(2000). "'Proposal' exists at that stage in the development of an action when an agency subject to the Act has a goal and is actively preparing to make a decision on one or more alternative means of accomplishing that goal and the effects can be meaningfully evaluated." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (2000).

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Here, the Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS was published October 12, 1994. See ROD at 8. Interior claims it continued to integrate NEPA analysis. The FEIS was completed in October, 2000, and published in November, 2000.

The first question is whether the TRFEFR was a recommendation on a proposal for major federal action, thereby requiring NEPA consideration.<sup>44</sup> Turning to the TRFEFR's text,

Plaintiffs are correct when they emphasize that the government errs when it contends that the APA's requirement for final agency action defines when NEPA requires preparation of an The four cases cited by the government are inapposite here, because they only hold that the APA requires "final agency action" before a plaintiff may challenge alleged NEPA violations. See ORNC Action, 150 F.3d at 1137 (affirming district court's dismissal of NEPA challenge, because the plaintiffs "cannot point to a deliberate decision by BLM to act or not to take action, " so did not meet the APA's requirement for final agency action); N.W. Res. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1060, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting federal defendants' argument that the plaintiffs did not challenge a final agency action, because they challenged the flow improvement measures (a SEIS and ROD) as inadequate, not the claim the government mischaracterized as not preparing an SEIS for transportation); Rapid Transit Advocates, Inc. v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 752 F.2d 373, 378-79 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the APA's final-agencyaction requirement was not met, because the government-defendant had "explicitly disavowed any advance commitment to approve construction, " the challenged action); Haw. County Green Party v. Clinton, 124 F.Supp.2d 1173, 1195-98 (D. Haw. 2000) (dismissing

the first seven chapters include the introduction, background, historical perspective, study approaches, results, and restoration strategies. Chapter Eight is entitled "Recommendations." The executive summary of the TRFEFR describes the individual purposes of each of its chapters, including Chapter Eight's recommendations "to utilize an Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (AEAM) approach to quide future management and ensure the restoration and maintenance of the fishery resources of the Trinity River" by "instream flow, channel-rehabilitation, and fine and coarse sediment" implementations, in order to support Chapter Seven's "conclusion that a modified flow regime, a reconfigured channel, and strategy for sediment management are necessary to have a functioning alluvial river . . . that will provide the diverse habitats required to restore and maintain the fishery resources of the Trinity River." Doc. 42 exhibit H at xxv (TRFEFR). The summary of the recommendations chapter also describes the integration of these three primary actions to be taken in order to allow the Trinity River to "resume its alluvial nature" and restore its anadromous salmonid fishery resources:

(1) increased instream releases

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plaintiffs' NEPA claim, finding the navy's commitment of resources to system development, binding itself to pay its ship builders, did not equate to binding itself to deploy the challenged sonar system before a final EIS, so there was no "final agency action" subject to review under APA).

By contrast, here, there was final agency action when the ROD was signed, which gives standing under APA to challenge the adequacy of NEPA review leading to that decision, <u>i.e.</u>, the TRFEFR, the BioOps, and the draft and final EIS/EIRs. When arguing against the TRO application, the government asserted that the ROD signing was <u>the</u> final agency action.

- (2) fine and coarse sediment management, and
- (3) mechanical channel alteration.

Id. at 289. The TRFEFR's recommended release schedules for each water-year class under the flow evaluation alternative (later the preferred alternative) are exactly the same as those adopted by the draft and final EIS/EIRs, and ultimately the ROD. Compare id. at 241 (TRFEFR table ES2) with Doc. 42 exhibit D at 12 (ROD); Doc. 42 exhibit I at 2-17 (DEIS table 2-5); Doc. 42 exhibit M at 2-96 (FEIS table 2-5). In simple terms, there was in chronological order:

- (1) the TRFEFR, published in June, 1999, which in March, 2000, recommends to Congress a modified flow regime for the Trinity River restoration;
- (2) the draft EIS/EIR, October, 1999, which examines the different flow regimes, choosing the "preferred alternative" (the flow evaluation alternative);
- (3) the final EIS/EIR, October, 2000, which makes minor modifications to the draft EIS; and
- (4) the ROD, December 19, 2000, which finally adopts the preferred alternative of the TRFEFR.

The government cannot plausibly argue that the TRFEFR, which compiled all the data regarding the Trinity River restoration and recommended a modified flow regime, subsequently submitted to Congress, does not constitute a recommendation on a proposal for

Apparently the DEIS had a typographical error, because it listed the release during a normal water year at 636,000 acrefeet, instead of 647,000, which the TRFEFR had listed, and was corrected by the FEIS, and finally included within the ROD.

major federal action. Although it was not for legislation, it was a published study and recommendation, jointly with the Hoopa Valley Tribe, to Congress at the stage in the development of the TRD restoration where Interior and the Hoopa Valley Tribe were actively preparing to make a decision on different alternative means (the different flow regimes) of accomplishing the Trinity River's restoration, where those effects could be meaningfully evaluated by Congress, implemented, and NEPA compliance ensured by the draft and final EIS/EIRs.

Because the TRFEFR constitutes a recommendation on a proposal for major federal action, an EIS was required. Was one timely performed?

An agency shall commence preparation of an environmental impact statement as close as possible to the time the agency is developing or is presented with a proposal (§ 1508.23) so that preparation can be completed in time for the final statement to be included in any recommendation or report on the proposal. The statement shall be prepared early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made (§§ 1500.2(c), 1501.2, and 1502.2).

40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (2000).

Preparation of an environmental impact statement on a proposal should be timed (§ 1502.5) so that the final statement may be completed in time for the statement to be included in any recommendation or report on the proposal. A proposal may exist in fact as well as by agency declaration

that one exists.

40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (2000). Under Interior's Departmental Manual, "[t]he feasibility analysis (go/no-go) stage, at which time an EIS is to be completed, is to be interpreted as the stage prior to the first point of major commitment to the proposal."

Doc. 93 exhibit C at § 4.3A.

Interior published the TRFEFR in June, 1999. It submitted it to Congress in March, 2000. However, between those dates, it completed the draft EIS in October, 1999, defining the preferred alternative. Environmental review was conducted of the recommendation for final action, because until the TRFEFR was submitted to Congress, it did not become a recommendation on a proposal for major federal action. The preferred alternative, as of March, 2000, was the "first major commitment to the proposal." The government did not violate NEPA by not first conducting an EIS of the TRFEFR before it released it publically.

Second, plaintiffs argue the government violated the NEPA by failing to analyze the potential adverse impacts of the NMFS and USFWS BioOps, because they are so closely related to the TRFEFR and the ROD, required to be implemented within the ROD, see Doc.

35 exhibit D at 11 ("the Department's agencies are directed, through the Trinity Management Council, to implement the Preferred Alternative as described in the FEIS/EIS and to implement the reasonable and prudent measures described in the NMFS and Service Biological Opinions."), and will effect independent changes to the CVP operations, that they also merit separate NEPA review. According to Mr. Snow, the USFWS BioOp includes a R&PM that requires the Bureau to minimize upstream X2

movement of more than 0.5 kilometer between February to June, which will change CVP operations to respond to such movement as if the ROD had not been implemented. See Doc. 35 exhibit C at 34 (USFWS BioOp, attached to FAC). 46 As a result, Westlands will potentially lose water because the only way to accommodate this X2 movement will be to either increase the Delta inflow by increasing releases of stored water, or reduce diversions of CVP water from the Delta, both actions that reduce available CVP water to Westlands, and can adversely affect the environment.

See Doc. 42 at ¶ 18. The NMFS BioOp also has a measure that can harm the plaintiffs by causing additional reductions of CVP-generated electricity, see Doc. 35 exhibit B at 37-38 (NMFS BioOp), 47 which has not been considered. Plaintiffs also argue

For example, the USFWS BioOp gives as a R&PM that "Reclamation shall minimize the effects of reoperating the CVP resulting from the implementation of the Preferred Alternative within the Trinity River Basin on listed fish in the delta."

Doc. 35 exhibit C at 33 (USFWS BioOp). It requires Reclamation to implement the below action:

If Reclamation in its annual operations planning process detects that implementation of the Preferred Alternative will result in an upstream (eastward) movement of X2 in any month between February 1 through June 30 of 0.5 km, Reclamation shall incorporate within its operating plan measures that can and will be implemented to minimize or eliminate such upstream movements.

<sup>&</sup>lt;u>Id.</u> at 34.

The NFMS discusses the potential impacts to winter-run chinook by violations of CVP-OCAP BO temperature criteria caused by implementation of the preferred alternative. See id. at 37. For example, under the preferred alternative, there is a five percent (5.0%) increase in such violations (14.3% compared to 9.3%). See id. According to the BioOp, this increase is caused by the revised timing of exports from the Trinity River to the Sacramento River, i.e., shifting from spring/summer (presently) to summer/autumn (under the preferred alternative). See id.

that a supplemental EIS should have been prepared that analyzes the effect of implementation of the ROD's flow regime on the changed conditions of California's energy crisis, because less CVP-generated electricity will be available. The government disagrees, arguing that sufficient NEPA review of the adoption of the ROD had been conducted, and the ROD is the operative federal action affecting Westlands and the energy intervenors.

The salient question for this second alleged violation of NEPA is whether the two BioOps, with their associated R&PMs (the X2 movement requirement and the auxiliary bypass outlets), are connected actions under the NEPA such that the government is required to prepare an EIS under, 48 or alternatively, whether they constitute changed conditions or new information that require an SEIS.

"Although federal agencies are assigned the primary task of defining the scope of NEPA review and their determination is given 'considerable discretion,' connected or cumulative actions

To deal with the temperature problem, the BioOp recommends utilizing auxiliary bypass outlets on the Trinity Dam from July through October, a process that although not greatly beneficial to the Sacramento River temperature problems, does assist the Trinity River. See id. at 38. But because this additionally-released water will not also pass through the Trinity River Dam power plant, "[a] drawback to the auxiliary outlet releases is a loss in power generation at Trinity Dam." Id. Thus, plaintiffs argue that implementation of this NMFS BioOp, which is required by the ROD, "will have an adverse power supply impact, which has not been considered under NEPA." Doc. 89 at 19:15-16.

See also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1995). Congress recently proposed amendments to this section. See 2001 CONG US S 301 (107th Congress, 1st Session) (Feb 08, 2001) (introducing an amendment to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 into Senate that requires federal agencies to consult with state agencies and county and local governments on EISs).

must be considered together to prevent an agency from 'dividing a project into multiple "actions," each of which individually has an insignificant environmental impact, but which collectively have a substantial impact.'" Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Thomas v. Petersen, 753 F.2d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Alpine Lakes Prot. Soc'y v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1975))). Actions are "connected," which means that they are closely related and should be discussed in the same EIS, if they:

- a. Automatically trigger other actions which may require environmental impact statements.
- b. Cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken previously or simultaneously.
- c. Are interdependent parts of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification.

40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(i)-(iii) (2000). The two BioOps may be so connected to the ROD, that they should have been discussed in one FEIS together.<sup>49</sup>

Anticipating the government's rebuttal that BioOps are a separate phase of the implementation of the ROD, plaintiffs argue, citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a) (2000) ("Proposals or parts of proposals which are related to each other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall be evaluated in a single impact statement."), that because the ROD and the BioOps are so closely-related that they constitute a single action, they must be evaluated together. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a) (1) (iii) (2000). There is no question that the two

BioOps are "interdependent parts of a larger action," 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a) (1) (iii) (2000), depending on implementation of the preferred alternative for their justification, because the only reason for the X2 measure is that the ROD's implementation of the FEIS's preferred alternative (Flow Evaluation) reduces the water now flowing, which keeps X2 movement within an acceptable range.

On the other hand, even if the BioOps are not connected action, they may nevertheless constitute changed circumstances or new information that must be addressed in a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement/Report ("SEIS"). supplementation process is triggered when new information presents a 'seriously different picture of the environmental landscape' such that another in-depth look at the environment is necessary." (quoting Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1984)); see also Friends of the Clearwater, 222 F.3d at 557-58. "Agencies . . . [s]hall prepare supplements to either draft or final environmental impact statements if: (i) The agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns; or (ii) There are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts." C.F.R. 1502.9(c) (2000).

Plaintiffs point to National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh,
721 F.2d 767 (11th Cir. 1983), to support their allegation that
the government violated NEPA by not conducting further review of
the environmental impacts caused by the terms and conditions
imposed by the NMFS and USFWS BioOps. In that case, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court's decision finding that the
United States Army Corps of Engineers' decision not to prepare an
SEIS/EIR was reasonable, because the project (based on a
completed EIS/EIR) was conditioned on obtaining a permit, which
itself had significant independent environmental impacts that
should have been evaluated in an SEIS/EIR. See id. at 771-84
("appellants have shown that the Mitigation Plan involves a

number of proposed project changes that are likely to have a significant, though beneficial, impact on the environment in and around the proposed lake. . . . Given the plan's detailed proposals for mitigating any adverse environmental effects resulting from the creation of Lake Alma, as well as the role of the plan in allaying the environmental concerns of all relevant federal agencies, we conclude that the Mitigation Plan will have a significant qualitative environmental impact. The conclusion of Alma officials to the contrary is not reasonable and the district court's approval of that conclusion is clearly erroneous.") (footnote omitted).

So too here. The ROD adopts the preferred alternative and requires implementation of the two BioOps analyzing the preferred alternative. See Doc. 35 exhibit D at 2; 11 (ROD). The two BioOps impose significant environmental impacts, 50 even if they may be beneficial. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(1) (2000) ("Impacts . . . may be both beneficial and adverse. A significant effect may exist even if the Federal agency believes that on balance the effect will be beneficial."). These effects have not yet been analyzed in a supplemental EIS/EIR, but should be.

Last, the plaintiffs argue that California's current energy

Two possible impacts are: (1) the USFWS BioOp imposes the X2 mitigation standard that will have environmental impacts that have not been evaluated under NEPA; and (2) the NMFS BioOp's measure to deal with the water temperature has environmental impacts that have not yet been evaluated.

crisis<sup>51</sup> presents "a significant new circumstance requiring preparation and circulation of a [SEIS]." Doc. 37 at 23.

Professional Engineer Scheuerman writes that the "portion of the EIS addressing potential economic impacts to power customers associated with the preferred alternative was developed and finalized prior to the current exponential price increases being experienced by the California wholesale power market." Doc. 114 at ¶ 6(b) (declaration of Paul G. Scheuerman). The government disagrees: the ROD itself writes that "implementation of the Preferred Alternative will not have any immediate impacts to power supplies in California and that . . . substantial new supplies are expected to be developed in California over the next few years." Doc. 35 exhibit D at A-3.

It is indisputable that the California energy crisis constitutes changed circumstances, because it began subsequent to completion of the FEIS in October, 2000, when the FEIS characterized any problem as solely "several statewide alerts regarding insufficient reserves of available capacity." <u>Doc. 42</u> exhibit I at D2-92 (FEIS). 52 Interior was aware of the severe

See Doc. 93 exhibit B at 2 (January 17, 2001, proclamation of State of Emergency by California Governor Gray Davis) ("the imminent threat of widespread and prolonged disruption of electrical power to California's emergency services, law enforcement, schools, hospitals, homes, businesses and agriculture constitutes a condition of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within the state which, by reason of its magnitude, is likely to be beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and facilities of any single county or city").

The FEIS diminishes the import of the electrical crisis:

Completion of additional powerplants is anticipated to help avoid such alerts in the future. Construction of

electrical crisis in California before it signed the ROD on December 19, 2000, and should have continued "to take a 'hard look at the environmental effects of'" the ROD before signing it, Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d at 557-58, especially because implementation of the preferred alternative reduces available CVP-generated electricity, which affects "the quality of the human environment in a significant manner or to a significant extent not already considered," id. at 558. A supplemental EIS should be prepared. The reduced electricity not only harms the interests of the plaintiffs (entities with contracts for CVP electricity), but also the general populace of the State, because that electricity must be replaced one way or another, and stage three electrical emergencies can be more common if the available electricity for consumption in California is further diminished, depending on the level of reserves. 54

additional generating capacity is taking place, and will continue to take place, independent of any decision regarding the Trinity River Mainstem Fishery Restoration.

A detailed assessment regarding the impact of CVP power supplies on the greater California region was not conducted for the DEIS/EIR, other than what is presented in the Socioeconomics section. It is anticipated that as demand for power increases, additional power supplies will be built to meet the increase in total California demand.

Id. at D2-92, reflecting an analytical perspective that may have been justified before the energy crisis, but is inadequate to address current conditions.

See, e.g., Doc. 71 at ¶ 23 ("a Stage 3 alert occurs when reserves are, or are forecasted to be, less than 3 percent of demand; actual involuntary curtailments of customers would have begun if reserves fell below 1.5%.) (declaration of David Marcus).

Coincidentally, on the same day of the preliminary injunction hearing, Fresno and the rest of California again experienced Stage 3 rolling blackouts. <u>See, e.g.</u>, Matt Leedy &

Even the Western Area Power Administration ("WAPA") of the United States Department of Energy ("DOE") recognized that the CVP-TRD plays a crucial role in providing energy capacity, as well as electrical energy supply, for California. See Doc. 102 at ¶ 12-13 & exhibit H. In a letter dated August 23, 2000, WAPA reexamined the impacts of the preferred alternative on potential reliability, because WAPA's previous work for the draft and final EIS/EIRs had focused only on the potential economic impacts to CVP power. See id. For example, the government's declarant,

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Kerri Ginis, <u>Dark Day for State: Visalia, Fresno and Other Areas</u>
<u>Across California Hit by Blackouts</u>, Fresno Bee, Mar. 20, 2001, at
Al, Al0:

Power outages that dimmed most of the state Monday rolled through the Central Valley without warning, frustrating business owners and creating confusion at intersections with darkened traffic lights for up to two hours at a time. lights could go out again today if power plants stay down for maintenance and temperatures remain unseasonably high. . . . Several forces contributed to Monday's blackouts: cutbacks in electricity from hydroelectric facilities in the Pacific Northwest; a fire at a Southern California plant; plants that were offline for repairs; and high demand created by warm spring weather, said officials for California's electricity grid. . . . The California Independent System Operator called a Stage 3 power alert, the most serious, shortly before noon and ordered utilities to cut a total of 1,000 megawatts, causing more than 1.2 million customers to temporarily go dark. It was the first series of rotating blackouts since parts of the state went dim for two days in January. More than 55,000 customers from Fresno, Tulare and Kings counties lost power Monday. Areas hit included parts of Fresno, Clovis, Hanford and Visalia.

See also Paul Chavez, Second day of Rolling Blackouts Ordered in California, Fresno Bee, Mar. 20, 2001, at A1 ("California's utilities managers ordered rolling blackouts across the state for a second straight day Tuesday, cutting off more than 125,000 customers as demand for electricity again outstripped supply. The same factors that collided to strap California's power supply on Monday hit again, officials with the Independent System Operator said. Those include reduced electricity imports from the Pacific Northwest, numerous power plants offline for repairs and less power provided by cash-strapped alternative-energy plants.").

Martin A. Bauer, highlights that following the announcement of a Stage Three electrical emergency in California on January 17, 2001, "generation schedules were adjusted in order to utilize TRD hydroelectric facilities to produce additional power. This resulted in an increase in combined power production of 150 MW capacity and 1,200,000 kilowatt-hours energy by the Trinity and Judge Francis Carr Powerplants." Doc. 69(1) at ¶ 6. In other words, CVP-generated electricity from the TRD is not only important in terms of economic impact to the parties, but also with respect to the total available energy capacity for the State. The effects of implementation of the ROD on TRD-generated energy (especially with respect to state-wide energy capacity) in light of California's evolving energy crisis are new circumstances that do not appear to have been evaluated.

An SEIS, analyzing the effects of the two BioOps and the effect of implementation of the preferred alternative in light of the changed circumstances of California's current energy crisis, was necessary.

## 20 4. Conclusion

Plaintiffs have shown a threat of irreparable harm from implementation of the ROD (lost water and electrical energy), and a fair chance of success on the merits (incomplete NEPA review of the effects of the two BioOps, and the effect of implementation of the ROD with the changed circumstances of California's energy crisis). Because an injunction is an equitable form of relief,

Plaintiffs also argue that the government maladministered the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") in two ways:

the plaintiffs' possible harm must nevertheless be balanced within the totality of the circumstances of the TRD of the CVP. The ROD must move forward, because the law (CVPIA) mandates, and all parties admit, that the Trinity River must be restored. The court lacks the legal authority and the inclination to substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary. The balance is to minimize, if possible, any alleged harm to plaintiffs and all others affected during the pendency of this case.

Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction to prevent

<sup>(1)</sup> the USFWS issued a non-jeopardy biological opinion that requires a major change in CVP operations because of its X2 movement requirement; and (2) the NMFS maladministered the ESA by issuing an internally-conflicting biological opinion that on one hand does not anticipate any incidental take, and on the other hand gives R&PMs to deal with those incidental takes.

The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") governs judicial review of administrative decisions involving the Endangered Species Act. Under the APA, a court has the authority to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, or without observance of procedure required by law. Review under this standard is narrow and a court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency, particularly when the challenged decision implicates substantial agency expertise.

San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Badgley, \_\_ F.Supp.2d \_\_, 2000 WL 33174417, \*8 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (internal quotations, quotation marks, alteration marks, and ellipsis omitted).

Plaintiffs attack Interior's decision to adopt the Preferred Alternative of the TRFEFR as violative of the APA because it failed to: (1) confirm that the evidence in the record supports the "healthy river" objective; (2) confirm the existence of a reasonable scientific justification for the assumption that increased flows will achieve the goal of fishery restoration within the Trinity River; and (3) objectively evaluate plaintiffs' objections or other alternatives, instead acting with agency "bias."

These additional alleged violations need not be addressed at this preliminary stage, because the two prerequisites for preliminary injunctive relief have already been met. They do not, standing alone, raise a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits to justify injunctive relief.

Interior from implementing the increased water releases of the ROD is GRANTED, in part, as follows:

- (1) the defendants, their agents, or those acting for them, shall be ENJOINED, pending further order or entry of judgment in this case, from changing CVP operations to release more than an additional 28,600 acre-feet of water over the 340,000 AF statutorily-required releases into the Trinity River to implement the ROD; 56 but
- (2) all other aspects of the ROD regarding river restoration may proceed.

## 5. Bond Requirement

Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure facially requires posting of a bond by the party seeking an injunction every time an injunction issues: "no restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant . . . . " Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) (2000) (emphasis added). "The amount of security is properly left to the discretion of the trial court. Failure to consider the question of security is error." 13 Moore's § 65.50[1], at 65-92 to 65-93 (citing cases); see also Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc., 198 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) grants district courts wide discretion in setting the amount of a security bond. Thus, we review the district

This amount is used because the government predicts that the 2001-2002 water year will be critically dry, which under the preferred alternative only requires releasing an additional 28,600 acre-feet of water. Releases under the ROD are limited to this volume until the decision on the merits can be done.

court's decision as to the amount of a security bond for an abuse of discretion.") (citations omitted).

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Some courts, however, permit indigent or poor parties either to not post or post nominal bond amounts. See, e.g., Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228, 1237 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding nominal \$1000 bond per plaintiff, where district court found that any cost to defendant, even if wrongfully enjoined, would be minimal, though plaintiffs had not made a formal showing of indigency); Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park & River Forest High Sch. Dist. No. 200 v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 10 F.Supp.2d 971, 981 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (ordering \$10 bond, after considering the parent-plaintiffs' financial situation); Wilson v. Office of the Civilian Health & Med. Program of the Uniformed Servs. (CHAMPUS), 866 F.Supp. 903, 909-10 (E.D. Va. 1994) (requiring military dependant/insured to post \$0 bond for issuance of preliminary injunction preventing CHAMPUS from denying coverage for high-dose chemotherapy, where insured had limited financial resources, substantial likelihood of success on merits, and requiring any more substantial bond possibly could cost insured her life) (citing Warner v. Ryobi Motor Prods. Corp., 818 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. S.C. 1992) (requiring only \$250 bond because plaintiff had limited financial resources); Kulakowski v. Rochester Hosp. Serv. Corp., 779 F.Supp. 710, 717 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (not requiring bond where plaintiff demonstrated inability to pay)); California v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The court has the discretion to dispense with the security requirement, or to request mere nominal security, where requiring security would effectively deny access to judicial review."); but

see Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 201 F.3d 883, 888 (7th
Cir. 2000) ("When setting the amount of security, district courts
should err on the high side.").<sup>57</sup>

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The district court may also set a low bond if the risk of harm to the defendant from erroneous issuance of the injunction is low. See Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 421 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999). 58

The latter consideration militates toward a reduced bond for plaintiffs: the government will not be materially harmed by this

For an extensive examination of the bond requirement and its exceptions, see Erin Connors Morton, Note, Security for Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c): Exceptions to the Rule Gone Awry, 46 Hastings L.J. 1863, 1864 (1995) ("Rather than treating the security requirement as mandatory and carving out narrow exceptions for these public interest litigants, at least two circuits have interpreted the language of Rule 65(c) as vesting the trial court with unfettered discretion to waive the bond. Other circuits, while recognizing that the bond is mandatory and that the court's discretion is limited to setting the amount of the bond, have formulate narrow exceptions for which waiver is appropriate.").

<sup>&</sup>quot;In fixing the amount of an injunction bond, the district court should be guided by the purpose underlying Rule 65(c), which is to provide a mechanism for reimbursing an enjoined party for harm it suffers as a result of an improvidently issued injunction or restraining order. The amount of the bond, then, ordinarily depends on the gravity of the potential harm to the enjoined party: The judge usually will fix security in an amount that covers the potential incidental and consequential costs as well as either the losses the unjustly enjoined or restrained party will suffer during the period he is prohibited from engaging in certain activities or the complainant's unjust enrichment caused by his adversary being improperly enjoined or restrained. Where the district court determines that the risk of harm is remote, or that the circumstances otherwise warrant it, the court may fix the amount of the bond accordingly. In some circumstances, a nominal bond may suffice. " Id. (quoting 11A Federal Practice & Procedure § 2954, at 292, and citing Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974)) (alteration marks and internal citation omitted).

preliminary injunction, because the status quo is maintained, i.e., the statutorily-mandated 340,000 acre-foot annual minimum Trinity River Flow remains, an amount that has been in place for at least a decade through severe droughts, and only for the "limited" time until the case is adjudicated on the merits. Plaintiffs demonstrate a reasonable possibility of success on the merits, because the government should have prepared an SEIS that analyzes the effects of the two BioOps and the changed circumstances of California's energy crisis.

To guard against the possible, but compensable, harm the government may suffer from erroneous issuance of a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs are ORDERED to post a bond of \$15,000, one-half by the water-districts, and one-half by the power intervenors, before the preliminary injunction issues.

## CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs (the water-districts, NCPA, and SMUD), meet the Ninth Circuit's requirements for issuance of a limited preliminary injunction: irreparable injury (lost CVP water and electrical energy) and likelihood of success on the merits (incomplete NEPA review of the effect of the two BioOps and the changed circumstances of California's energy crisis), which will issue immediately following their posting a \$15,000 bond, one-half by the water-districts (\$7,500 by the water-districts; and \$3,750 each by NCPA and SMUD). The injunction limits additional (i.e., above the statutorily-mandated 340,000 acre-feet) water releases to 28,600 acre-feet, but otherwise allows every other physical aspect of the ROD's Trinity River restoration to move

To expedite resolution of the issues raised by this case, prudence counsels preparation of an SEIS that evaluates the matters described above to comply with NEPA. is invited on whether this proceeding on preliminary injunction should be converted to one to make final determination of the issues presented, in order to further expedite entry of final judgment. 

The parties are ORDERED to meet, confer, and within ten (10) days following March 19, 2001, submit a proposed form of order in conformance with this decision.

The parties' input

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

SO ORDERED.

DATED: 2001 March 22.

United States District Court for the Eastern District of California March 23, 2001

\* \* CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE \* \*

1:00-cv-07124

Westlands Water Dist

v.

US Dept of Interior

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of California.

That on March 23, 2001, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office, or, pursuant to prior authorization by counsel, via facsimile.

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Jack L. Wagner, Clerk

BY: